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IntroductionI. 
This report has both a more limited and a wider focus than many of the others 
in this collection. It is narrower because it examines only the insurance aspects 
of the various causation and other issues highlighted by the research project. 
That is, it only deals with the matters raised in part IV of the Questionnaire. 
However, it is wider in that it forms part of a much larger study of the rela-
tionship between insurance and the tort system.1 In that study insurance is de-
scribed as providing the “lifeblood” of the law of tort. Although the influence 
of insurance upon the common law rules is only partial, insurers are of vital 
importance to the system of compensation for personal injury as a whole. They 
administer the system and exercise considerable control over it. Without them 
the importance of tort law would be very much diminished.
Although this report is limited to the law of England and Wales, it also makes 
occasional reference to the position in the USA because judges in the UK have 
drawn comparisons with that jurisdiction, and there has been much more liti-
gation in that country on the issues highlighted here. One difference between 
the two countries, however, is that the position in the UK is more complicated 
because insurers have not adopted standard wording as they have in the USA, 
for example, in relation to general liability policies. There are no standard form 
words universally used in insurance policies for United Kingdom risks.
As a preliminary matter it is important to note that it is not possible to answer 
with confidence or in detail several of the questions posed by the Question-
1 See the present author’s previous contributions: R. Lewis in: G. Wagner, Tort Law and Liability 
Insurance (2005) at 47 ff.; Insurance and the Tort System (2005) 25 (1) Legal Studies 85 ff.; 
Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: Acknowledging the “Elephant in the Living Room” 
(2005) J Personal Injury Law 1–11; How Important are Insurers in Compensating Claims for 
Personal Injury in the UK? (2006) 31 (2) Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 323 ff. A revised 
version of the latter article appeared in booklets published by Munich Re, How to Better React 
to Developments in Liability Insurance (2006) 76 ff.; Risk Liability and Insurance: Tort Law and 
Liability Insurance (2007) 29 ff.
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naire relating to the actual practice of insurers. This is because there has been 
little empirical examination of the common practice of insurers or how policies 
are construed on a day to day basis. Nor has there been much analysis of which 
form of policy wording predominates in the various forms of insurance. The 
literature instead concentrates upon judicial interpretation of specific clauses 
relevant to particular disputes, and this court-based approach to the analysis 
of insurance practice forms the foundation of the present report. It may not 
therefore always reflect current insurance practice.
A further complication is that it is very difficult to make statements that are 
applicable to all forms of insurance. As an example, the Questionnaire recogn-
ises the potential difference between compulsory liability insurances and those 
obtained voluntarily (see Question 43 infra no. 48). It is indeed the case that the 
rules relating to third-party liability where insurance may be compulsory dif-
fer from those applied to first party loss insurance. In addition, the wording in 
policies dealing with different varieties of first party cover may be particular to 
the individual insurances. A single insurer may use different words in different 
types of policy even though the clauses deal with similar, or even identical, is-
sues. It is therefore not possible to provide clear answers which are applicable 
to all forms of insurance at all times.
Specific Questions in Part IV of the QuestionnaireII. 
Caps and DeductiblesA. 
35. In your national legal system, are there statutory principles or have the 
courts developed general principles that address the issue of whether a dam-
age event is considered to be a single incident, in which case it is the insurer’s 
overall liability that is limited by any applicable cap, or a plurality of several 
independent losses, in which case the cap applies to each, leaving the insurer 
to pay up to the specified sum for each one? Alternatively, is this issue ad-
dressed by standard clauses used in contracts of insurance?
In the UK there are no statutory principles but there are general principles 
which have been developed by the courts. There are clauses in insurance con-
tracts which deal with the issues but there is no standard-form wording which 
universally is used.
Both this Question, and Question 37 below, focus upon whether the loss results 
from a single incident or a plurality, and this lies at the heart of the insurance 
section of the research project. Unfortunately the deceptively simple question 
cannot be met with a simple answer. It requires, first, close consideration of 
the specific words used in particular policies; and second, the application of 
what are very uncertain rules relating to causation. What therefore follows is 
an extensive analysis of the relevant principles relating to Questions 35 and 
37. These principles are then used to suggest probable answers for the specific 
problems set in Questions 36 and 38.
 4
 5
 6
England and Wales: Insurance 127
The difficulties that can arise in applying the relevant rules may be illustrated 
by reference to the typical words of a public liability policy:
“The insurer agrees to indemnify the Insured in respect of all sums 
which the Insured has become legally liable to pay as compensation for:
(a) accidental death of or accidental personal injury to any person
(b) accidental loss of or accidental damage to material property
occurring during the policy period.”
The problems caused by potential multiple causes of damage can be illustrated 
by the difficulties the courts have experienced in construing the meaning of 
both “accidental” and “occurring” as used in the above wording. To what ex-
tent can an “accident,” or an “event,” or “occurrence” be found even though 
there are a number of elements which may have combined to cause the loss? In 
effect, as the Questionnaire asks, is there a single incident or a plurality?
“Accident”
An early attempt by insurers to avoid the complications caused by multiple 
causation of damage involves the use of the word “accidental” injury to dis-
tinguish damage caused by wear and tear, or injury resulting from disease or 
the natural ageing process. The latter are thought to be ten times more likely 
to be the cause of disability in the population compared to accidents causing 
personal injury. For some types of policy, therefore, insurers have been keen 
to limit the scope of their liability and to exclude gradual developments which 
cause loss or disability. Because the causal factors in disease cases are much 
harder to identify, the allocation of liability is much more uncertain. By con-
trast it is usually much clearer to identify the cause of injury and responsibility 
for it where an “accident” is involved.
Accident therefore became one of the first battlegrounds over which disputes 
concerning multiple causal factors were fought. Insurers specified “accident” 
in the hope of distinguishing losses caused gradually where there is no clear 
“trigger” upon which liability under a policy can be based. Slow, hidden, pro-
gressive damage is harder to identify, mitigate, and control. However, insurers’ 
attempts to avoid such liabilities had only limited success.
An early setback for insurers was in the case of Hamlyn v Crown Accidental 
Insurance Co Ltd.2 The claimant was insured for “any bodily injury caused 
by violent, accidental, external and visible means.” No doubt the insurer had 
used this combination of words in an attempt to prevent any liability arising 
for internal hidden physiological changes. This was reinforced by a clause in 
the policy which excluded liability for injuries arising from “natural disease or 
weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease.” In spite of this, the com-
pany was held liable when the insured dislocated the cartilage in his knee when 
2 [1893] 1 Queen’s Bench (QB) 750.
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bending over to pick up a marble. The fact he had suffered an internal injury 
did not prevent it being classified as an accident because the injury had been 
unexpected. The court treated the insured’s bending over and stooping for the 
marble as external means.
Further difficulty was caused for insurers by courts interpreting “accident” dif-
ferently depending upon whether claims were being made, for example, under 
the life insurance element of a travel policy,3 under a workers’ compensation 
policy,4 or in seeking compensation under the Warsaw5 or Montreal6 Conven-
tions. In some cases an accident has been held to have a very wide meaning 
indeed. It has even been held to encompass the situation where in fact a disease 
is suffered. This is because the accident is taken to occur at the point where the 
bacillus penetrates the skin to cause the infection – even though this infection 
may take some time to reveal itself.7 The artificial, but precise, point in time 
when the bacillus enters the body is sufficient to distinguish an “accident” 
from the gradual onset of illness which has no such trigger point.
To try to limit the court’s discretion to find liability in such a case, insurers 
have sought to define further the meaning of “accident” so as to exclude dis-
ease. Similarly, in property damage policies accidental loss has been defined 
with the intention of limiting liability for the gradual infliction of damage over 
a period of time. The specific time, place and cause of the accident must be 
established. Even then a regularly occurring event has been held to result in 
liability, as where regular releases of chlorine gas were each found to be ac-
cidental after measures had been taken to prevent their re-occurrence.8
However, it is not always the case that insurers have sought to revise policy 
wording in order to limit their exposure. They have also allowed cover to ex-
pand to meet the needs of the marketplace. For example, by the 1960s the 
use of “accident” in the standard liability policy in the USA was thought too 
restrictive for the market because it did not admit claims which were based on 
events which were not “sudden.” This denied coverage, for example, where 
toxic chemicals leaked from a storage site over a long period of time. In or-
der to meet demands for insurance in such circumstances the wording of the 
standard policy was changed from “accident” to “occurrence” with the inten-
tion that human error which led to continuous or repeated exposures and sub-
sequent damage would be covered. The needs of those requiring insurance 
3 De Souza v Home & Overseas Insurance Co Ltd [1995] Lloyd’s Reinsurance Law Reports 
(LRLR) 453. 
4 Fenton v Thorley [1903] Appeal Cases (AC) 443.
5 Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2004] QB 234.
6 Barclay v British Airways [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports (Lloyd’s Rep) 661.
7 Brintons v Turvey [1905] AC 230. For a detailed examination see R. Lewis, Compensation For 
Industrial Injury (1987) 37 ff., and id., What is an Accident? (1987) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 76.
8 Australian Paper Manufacturers v American International Underwriters [1994] 1 Victorian Re-
ports (VR) 685.
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against causing gradual environmental damage could then be met. This was 
followed by a third phase from about 1973 when insurers became more cir-
cumspect, particularly when underwriting pollution coverage.9 In the UK, al-
though the wording of policies is less standardised than in the USA, similar 
trends can be identified operating from somewhat later dates.
Occurrence of an Event
The use of “occurrence” instead of “accident” has given rise to its own prob-
lems of interpretation, especially in the last fifteen years or so. Although insur-
ers have been prepared to accept liability for human error which causes dam-
age over a period of time, they have continued to be anxious to avoid liability 
for damage caused by ordinary wear and tear or by the progression of natural 
causes.10 As in the case of “accident,” an event has been described as “some-
thing which happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in a particular 
way” even if it is not sudden.11 Continued unidentified incidents may then not 
give rise to an “event” or an “occurrence” which triggers liability under the 
policy. But again the interpretation of these words varies, and it can be hard to 
draw the dividing lines.
The practical importance of the distinctions relating to “occurrence” can be 
illustrated as follows:
An “occurrence” may be needed to trigger any liability under the policy • 
at all.
A policy commonly will limit liability to a maximum sum per occurrence. • 
If then there is only one occurrence but there are multiple losses, the insur-
er’s exposure is limited. By contrast, if there is more than one occurrence, 
the insurer’s liability is multiplied.
A policy will often be subject to a deductible so as not to cover the initial • 
amount of the claim. Again this limit will apply per occurrence, and the 
insurer’s liability may then be reduced if there are multiple occurrences 
each with its own deductible (see Question 37 infra no. 30). The legality 
of a deductible is affected by whether the insurance protects only liability 
to a third party and is in an area where it has been made compulsory by 
legislation. The legislation then requires the policyholder to have either 
unlimited cover or cover up to a set sum. Within this legislative framework 
no possibility of a deductible exists at present. 
Apart from the maximum sum per occurrence, a policy might also be sub-• 
ject to an aggregate limit for all claims so that the insurer is protected no 
matter how many occurrences are involved (see infra no. 33). Similarly 
claims series clauses in effect may treat independent damage events as if 
they were a single event (see infra no. 43).
9 M. Clarke, Liability Insurance on Pollution Damage [1994] J Business Law 545.
10 Lloyd LJ in Schiffshypothekenbank Zu Luebeck AG v Compton (The Alexion Hope) [1988] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 311.
11 AXA Reinsurance(UK) v Field [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 233.
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If more than one occurrence is found, it may therefore benefit either insurer or 
insured, depending upon the particular facts. It could be in the interest of either 
party to argue in favour of multiple occurrences. For example:
If an insured has a policy limit of a maximum sum of £ 1 million per oc-• 
currence with a deductible of £ 100,000 and there is no aggregate limit, the 
insured gains up to £ 900,000 for each additional occurrence.
If the insured’s policy also has an aggregate limit of £ 10 million, the in-• 
sured will benefit from each additional £ 1 million occurrence up to and 
including ten occurrences.
However, for every occurrence up to the aggregate limit the insured’s re-• 
covery will also be reduced by the amount of the deductible of £ 100,000, 
and there can be no recovery beyond the aggregate limit of £ 10 million.
It is not only primary insurance companies and insureds that may be involved 
in these disputes, but also reinsurers. Indeed perhaps the most fertile ground 
for litigation has involved these forms of secondary insurance and the treaties 
offered by reinsurance companies. A case which illustrates the practical con-
sequences in relation to reinsurance is Caudle v Sharp.12 The Court of Appeal 
was faced with the question of whether losses could be aggregated under a 
reinsurance treaty because of one single “event,” or whether there were sev-
eral events, in which case reinsurance would be curtailed because it applied 
only to liability for losses exceeding prescribed limits in respect of one event. 
The reinsured argued that a managing agent, who had placed individuals on a 
loss-making syndicate at Lloyd’s, had a “blind spot” in failing adequately to 
research and investigate asbestos risks. This failure, it was argued, constituted 
the “event” that had led to losses arising from asbestos-related claims set up 
under 32 reinsurance contracts. In contrast, the reinsurer argued that entry to 
each of the 32 contracts was the “event” and that it could not therefore be liable 
for the aggregate losses.
The Court found in favour of the reinsurer, concluding that the agent’s “blind 
spot” was not an “event” unless he acted upon it, so that there were 32 events 
rather than one. To be a single event the losses had to be bound together by a 
common factor other than there having been a series of similar occurrences or 
losses. An event was held to have three components:
there must be a common factor that can properly be described as an event • 
(it must be limited in time and space); and
it must satisfy a test of causation (the event must be capable of producing • 
legally relevant consequences); and
it must not be too remote in the circumstances (so that realistically it must • 
be the kind of event that the parties to the contract contemplated).
12 [1995] LRLR. 433.
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The Unities of Time, Place and Cause
As the above case of Caudle v Sharp indicates, whether a court finds an occur-
rence or event, as opposed to a series of incidents, depends upon the unities 
of time, place and cause. These factors were clearly laid out by the arbitra-
tor in a decision of much persuasive authority, known as the Dawson’s Field 
arbitration:13
“An ‘occurrence’ … is not the same as a loss, for one occurrence may em-
brace a plurality of losses. Nevertheless, the losses’ circumstances must 
be scrutinised to see whether they involve a degree of unity to justify their 
being described as, or as arising out of, one occurrence….. In assessing 
the degree of unity regard may be had to such factors as cause, locality 
and time and the intentions of human agents.”
The arbitration arose out of the hijacking by Palestinian terrorists of four air-
craft from different locations on a single day in 1970. Three of the four planes 
were flown to an airstrip in Jordan while the fourth was flown to Cairo. All 
four aircraft were later blown up by the terrorists. The issue was whether the 
destruction of the three aircraft in Jordan was the result of one occurrence or 
three. This was the key to an excess of loss reinsurance contract that covered 
“each and every loss … and/or occurrence and/or series of occurrences aris-
ing out of one event.” The arbitrator decided that the destruction of the three 
aeroplanes constituted one event. This was because the aircraft were destroyed 
“in close proximity more or less simultaneously, within the time span of a few 
minutes, and as a result of a single decision to do so.” However, if the aircraft 
had been destroyed when hijacked, the arbitrator indicated that he would have 
found separate occurrences because, even though there was a common purpose 
behind the hijacking, the aircraft had been taken by different people from very 
different places. The arbitrator rejected the argument that there was a single 
event simply because there had been an overall plan. The terrorist plan by 
itself could not constitute an event, but the common purpose when allied to 
the unities of time and place were the reasons for finding only one event and 
not three.
The Dawson’s Field arbitration was the key authority relied upon in the later 
case of Kuwait Airways Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co.14 The claim in 
this case was for the loss of fifteen aircraft which had been seized at Kuwait 
airport after that country had been invaded by Iraq in 1990. They were flown 
to Iraq and incorporated into the fleet of that country. The loss of all the planes 
owned by Kuwait Airways occurred at the same time and place, and each was 
lost as a result of the invasion by the forces of Saddam Hussein. The decision 
is thus similar to that reached in Dawson’s Field.
13 Rix J in Kuwait Airways Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Company [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 
citing Michel Kerr QC in the unreported arbitration case, Dawson’s Field 29 March 1972.
14 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664.
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However, these two cases contrast with the findings made in relation to another 
case concerning an aircraft seized during the occupation of Kuwait. In Scott 
v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co15 a plane belonging to British Airways was 
seized at the same time as the others in Kuwait. However, unlike the others, it 
was not flown to Iraq but instead remained at the airport. It was not destroyed 
until some months later when it was bombed during the attempt to liberate the 
country. This loss was held not to arise out of the same event that had led to the 
claim for the other aircraft. Although there was unity of place, there was a time 
difference involved and the effective legal cause of loss was not the seizure of 
the airport, but the liberation of it. The concept of aggregation of loss required 
a significant causal link between the events in question and a single unifying 
event. In this case there was not a sufficient causal link between the plurality 
of aircraft losses for them to constitute a single aggregated claim. As a result 
the primary loss insurers were unable to add the British Airways plane to their 
claim against a reinsurer under the terms of their excess of loss policy covering 
one event.
In another example, the lack of unity in both time and place proved crucial 
in denying that there was one occurrence where, following riots in Indonesia 
preceding the resignation of President Suharto, damage was caused to 21 of 
the 67 shops owned by the same company. The damage was found to result 
from several occurrences because it took place over two days and in different 
locations spread over some thirty miles.16 A single occurrence could not be 
found just because there was a common underlying cause or because there was 
a common intent or purpose involved.
These cases illustrate that fine lines must be drawn. How long must be the 
separation in time for the damage to be regarded as the result of more than 
one occurrence? What distance is required between the sites where damage 
occurs in order for a separate occurrence to be found? What exactly constitutes 
a common purpose? How are “effective” legal causes of loss to be identified 
and distinguished from other factors which are held not to be legally relevant? 
No clear answers can be given to these questions because each case must be 
decided on its particular facts. As the first instance judge stated in Scott:17
“I have been referred to a number of authorities. In a real sense I think the 
question is one of impression which does not bear too much analysis.”
Even though there is no bright line rule which can be easily applied, the above 
principles can be used to help to resolve the hypothetical problems posed in 
the Questionnaire.
15 [2003] Lloyd’s Law Reports Insurance and Reinsurance (Lloyd’s Rep IR) 696.
16 DP Mann v Lexington Insurance Co [2001] Lloyd’s Rep 1.
17 [2003] 2 Commercial Law Cases (CLC) 431at 457.
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36. CASE STUDY (building insurance and insurance cap) P is the owner of facto-
ry premises consisting of several buildings which he has insured against harm 
resulting from severe weather conditions. The insurer’s liability is capped at 
€ 500,000 per damage event. During a thunderstorm that lasts several hours, 
two of the buildings are struck by lightning and both are completely burnt 
down. Each of the buildings was worth € 300,000. What is the insurer’s obliga-
tion to pay for the damage under the policy?
Where premises are insured for a maximum sum, what is to happen after a 
storm lasting several hours causes damage in excess of the overall limit when 
two separate lightning strikes hit two of the buildings? Applying the above 
tests, it is likely that the insurer would be able to limit its liability by reference 
to the £ 500,000 maximum sum insured, although this would depend upon the 
specific words used in policy. The reason for this is that the damage occurs 
over a short period of time, at the same general locality (albeit to separate 
buildings), and it is caused by the same type of natural event. The unities of 
time, place and cause thus appear to be satisfied. This leads to the conclusion 
that there is only one event which has caused the loss, and that the limit to the 
insurer’s liability is effective.
There is some analogy here with the litigation that took place following the ter-
rorist strike and the subsequent collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York in 2001.18 There is some UK authority for seeing the de-
struction caused by the two aircraft striking two separate buildings within eigh-
teen minutes of one another as being caused by one event, albeit separate from 
the similar attack on the same day on the Pentagon in Washington.19 However, 
there is also some USA authority which runs counter to such an analysis: in a 
much older case two adjacent walls collapsed 50 minutes apart, and were held to 
have done so as a result of two “accidents” even though both of these had been 
caused by the same storm.20 A division in analysis is also to be found in the USA 
decisions concerning the events of 9/11. In relation to insurance policies that 
contained a definition of “occurrence” one court found that the collapse of the 
two buildings constituted a single occurrence.21 By contrast, after a trial involv-
ing those policies that did not define what amounted to an “occurrence,” a jury 
held that the collapse of the two buildings constituted two occurrences.
However, an important qualification must be added to the above analysis: the 
solution to such problems depends upon the precise wording of the insurance 
18 M.S. Moore, The Destruction of the World Trade Center and the Law on Event-Identity, in: J. 
Hyman/H. Steward (eds.), Action and Agency (2004).
19 P & C Insurance Ltd v Silversea Cruises [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 696.
20 Arthur A Johnson Corp v Indemnity Co, 164 North Eastern Reporter, Second Series (NE2d) 704 
(1959).
21 SR International Business Insurance Co, Ltd v World Trade Center Properties LL, 222 Federal 
Supplement, Second Series (F.Supp.2d) 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affirmed by World Trade Center 
Properties LLC v Hartford Fire Insurance Co 345 Federal Reporter Third Series (F.3d) 154 (2d 
Cir. 2003).
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contract. For example, the use of “originating cause” rather than “event” or 
“occurrence” has been held to be much less restrictive and to encompass a 
continuing state of affairs or the absence of something happening.22 See also 
infra no. 33.
37. In your national legal system, have the courts developed general principles 
that address the issue of whether a damage event is considered to be a single 
incident, in which case the insured has to bear any stipulated deductible only 
once, or a plurality of several independent losses, in which case the deductible 
applies to each, leaving the insured to bear the amount several times? Alter-
natively, is this issue addressed by standard clauses used in contracts of insur-
ance? If third-party insurance is required by law, would this have any effect on 
the legality of a deductible?
See answer to Question 35 supra no. 5 ff.
38. CASE STUDY (auditors’ liability) P, an independent auditor engaged by X 
Ltd to certify its accounts, is asked by X Ltd to meet with two potential inves-
tors in the company, A and B. At the meeting, P vouches for the company’s 
financial well-being. In consequence, A and B make large purchases of shares 
in X Ltd. It transpires that P negligently misrepresented the value of the com-
pany to the investors. A and B consequently suffer economic losses which they 
seek to recover as damages from P. In principle, their losses are covered by P’s 
professional indemnity insurance, but according to the terms of the policy the 
insured has to bear a deductible of € 5,000 per damage event. In the instant 
case, does P have to bear the deductible amount only once or with regards to 
both claims?
The insurer could argue on the basis of Caudle v Sharp that, although the neg-
ligent advice was the single cause of the losses, each investment was a separate 
occurrence and two deductibles should be applied to the claim. However, this 
is the less likely solution for it is the insured who appears to have the stronger 
case: the advice was given on one occasion and was thus limited in time and 
space; the advice was the clear cause of loss; and it was not too remote because 
all the parties anticipated that investment would result from the advice given. 
There is a unity of time, place and cause and it is therefore likely that only one 
deductible would be applied and only one occurrence found.
As in the answer to Question 36 (supra no. 27 ff.), it is necessary to add the 
qualification that the correct approach to such cases depends on the precise 
wording of the insurance contract. See further supra no. 29.
22 Axa Reinsurance (UK) v Field [1996] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 1026.
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Other Limits on the Amount of CoverB. 
Aggregate limit clauses1. 
39. In your country, do standard-term insurance policies use aggregate limit 
clauses whereby the liability of the insurer is capped by a maximum amount 
per specified period? If so, please give examples of how these clauses are 
worded and how they are interpreted, paying particular regard to the issue of 
whether a damage event is considered to be a single indivisible loss (therefore 
falling into only one period) or a plurality of losses (potentially falling into 
several different periods).
Aggregate limit clauses are used in respect of United Kingdom risks, but, as 
previously mentioned, there are no standard-form words in universal use, so 
everything turns on the wording of the individual policy. In this context, it 
should be noted that one leading work, in particular, emphasises the dangers of 
embarking upon too general a discussion of the issues:23
“… different aggregation clauses employ different language. It is im-
portant not to try and impose upon any particular aggregation clause a 
preconception that the particular claims should or should not be aggre-
gated – but instead to give effect to the language used. Any attempt to 
identify and then impose a single, coherent philosophy of aggregation 
would inevitably be insensitive to differences in policy wording and ac-
cordingly doomed to failure.”
Claims series clauses2. 
40. In your country, do standard-term insurance policies use claims series 
clauses whereby several independent damage events are treated as a single 
damage event (a single series) which is subject to a single liability cap? If 
so, please give examples of how these clauses are worded and how they are 
interpreted. Please state in particular what criteria are used for distinguishing 
between several independent damage events and a single damage series.
Claims series clauses may treat independent damage events as if they were a 
single event. As previously mentioned, however, there are no standard-form 
words universally used in insurance policies for United Kingdom risks, so ev-
erything turns on the wording of the individual policy. 
23 J.L. Powell/R. Stewart (eds.), Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (6th ed. 2007) 
para. 8-096.
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Long tail damage3. 
41. In your country, do standard-term insurance policies use clauses whereby 
the liability of a former insurer is limited to a specified period of time after the 
end of the insurance contract? If so, please give examples of how these clauses 
are worded and how they are interpreted. What is considered to be the starting 
point for the relevant limitation period (e.g. the date on which the insurance 
contract ended, the date of the insured’s negligence or the date on which the 
damage was sustained)? In this context, where is the line drawn between sev-
eral independent damage events and a single damage event? 
As previously mentioned, there are no standard-form words universally used 
in insurance policies for United Kingdom risks. In brief, the answers to these 
questions are that such clauses are used, albeit with varying wording; that the 
“starting point” for liability under the policy depends upon the particular clause 
used and upon the court’s interpretation of it; and that the general principles 
which have been described above are again used to distinguish several events 
from single occurrences. However, it is with regard to the “starting point” for 
coverage that courts have encountered acute difficulty. This requires extensive 
discussion of the principles which the courts have developed.
When the event or occurrence that triggers the liability of the insurer has been 
identified, it must then be determined whether it falls within the period of 
cover. The causal date is all important. The answer is usually easy to provide 
in cases involving accidents because the exact point in time when the sudden 
event occurs is generally easy to identify; the time and place when cars col-
lide will be known. However, where an accident is not involved and the loss 
occurs gradually, especially if the damage remains undiscoverable for many 
years, it can be much more difficult to decide whether there is insurance cover-
age. There have therefore been particular problems with claims for cancer or 
asbestos-related disease,24 and issues have also been widely litigated in relation 
to product and environmental liability and, to a lesser extent, in relation to the 
liability of professionals.
Decisions again vary according to the precise words used in the particular insur-
ance contract, and much uncertainty results. For example, an injury “caused” 
during a period of insurance has been held to include the time from when the 
claimant was first exposed to the substance that later caused damage. How-
ever, policies written to cover diseases or injuries “occurring” or “sustained” or 
“contracted” may be more limited, and confined to the later time when injury 
to the claimant actually took place.
24 For discussion in relation to asbestos see C. Lahnstein, D. Maranger and N. Roenneberg’s paper 
in: Munich Re Group (ed.), 7th International Liability Forum (2003).
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The Three Triggers
Broadly, there are three possible triggers and four different rules which courts 
may use to fix the point at which insurance coverage may arise. Until recently it 
was very uncertain which of these rules would be adopted by a court in the UK. 
Although there is now Court of Appeal support for the second of them – being 
that favoured in the USA25 – the position remains uncertain. This is because 
further crucial litigation is presently taking place, and a High Court decision is 
imminent.26 In outline, in chronological order, the four possible rules are:
Exposure. a) 
The trigger here is when exposure occurs to the activity or circumstance which 
gives rise to the action. Because exposure is often a continuous process and 
may occur over a long period of time, there may be several insurers and a 
number of policies applicable to the loss. Recently in Bolton MBC v Municipal 
Mutual Insurance Ltd the Court of Appeal rejected the exposure theory.27 This 
was because the insurance policy indemnified against liability and, at the stage 
of exposure, there was no liability because the victim had yet to suffer a per-
sonal injury. In the absence of injury there could be no liability and therefore 
no insurance relevant. According to Longmore LJ:28
“It is inconsistent with principle because the contract between the parties 
is an agreement to indemnify against liability. It cannot be right that, at the 
stage of initial exposure or initial bodily reaction to such exposure, there 
could be a liability on the part of Bolton in respect of which they could 
require to be indemnified under any public liability insurance policy.”
Injury in fact. b) 
The trigger here may be later than when exposure took place because it begins 
when the damage actually occurs, even if the damage is not yet apparent and 
cannot be discovered. This means that it may be difficult to identify not only 
whether an injury has yet occurred, but also the exact point in time when it 
does so. These problems are especially acute in asbestos related disease cases. 
For example, even if pleural plaques are found in the lungs, the court has deter-
mined that an injury may not have been suffered.29 In the above case involving 
25 V. Fogelman, Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England and the United States (2005) 
para. 30.25.5.3 and R. Merkin, Reinsurance Law para. C.2.2-25.
26 Six test cases collectively known as the “Employer Liability Policy Trigger Litigation” were 
heard before Burton J in June 2008 in a hearing scheduled to last nine weeks. The lead case 
is Municipal Mutual Insurance v Zurich Insurance Co. At the time of writing the result of the 
litigation is not known. 
27 [2006] 1 WLR 1492.
28 [2006] 1 WLR 1492 at para. 15.
29 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 39, 
[2007] 3 WLR 876 noted by K. Oliphant in: H Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort 
Law 2006 (2008) at 155.
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Bolton MBC the injury in fact rule received much support from the Court of 
Appeal when it decided that the insurer’s liability to indemnify was triggered 
when cell mutation began. This was about ten years before there were any 
symptoms of the disease mesothelioma; and potentially it was decades after 
the date of exposure to asbestos itself. Although likely to be more restrictive 
than the exposure rule, the injury in fact trigger similarly may spread liability 
among a number of insurers. This is especially the case where there is gradual 
pollution damage for it has been accepted that the injury may be progressive 
and continuous over a period of time and it may thus spread liability over sev-
eral policy periods.
Manifestation. c) 
Adopting this rule would mean that there is no occurrence until the later time 
of when the injury becomes apparent.30 This reduces insurer liability by con-
centrating cover only upon those relatively recent policies which are in force 
when the injuries reveal themselves. Claims can even be concentrated into 
one policy year. In addition, this makes it very difficult, for example, for those 
working with asbestos to obtain any insurance cover at all. This is because new 
insurers are reluctant to assume liability for the past exposures. In fact, once 
the disease has been diagnosed, existing insurers are likely to cancel or not re-
new their policies in order to limit their liability to the existing claims and thus 
avoid future manifestations of injury. This can be a disaster for later claimants 
because they may find that they are suing an organisation that is worthless. 
On the other hand, the manifestation rule can be more favourable to claimants 
in one respect: for the purpose of limitation of actions (by which a time is set 
within which claims must be brought), the manifestation rule allows claims to 
be made later than under either the exposure or the injury in fact rules.
Tripple trigger.d) 
This is the broadest trigger for coverage. It was first developed in the USA in 
relation to asbestos claims, and offers a choice of any of the three alternatives 
listed above.31 That is, it fixes liability on any insurer whose policy was in force 
(i) at the time of initial exposure, or (ii) during continued exposure, or (iii) at the 
time of manifestation. This rule is therefore likely to draw a number of insurers 
into the liability net. However, the approach was recently rejected on the specific 
facts of the Bolton case because the Court could see no need for such a broad 
approach: the policy reasons in favour of compensation which applied in the 
USA in relation to the much greater number of asbestos disease claimants were 
thought not to apply in the UK. Even after the Bolton case much uncertainty 
remains. Hobhouse LJ was keen to limit the effect of his judgment:32
30 Eagle-Pitcher Industries v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co 682 F.2d 12 (1982).
31 Keene Corporation v Insurance Co of North America 667 F.2d 1034 (DC Cir 1981), cert denied 
455 US 1007 (1982).
32 Bolton v MBC Mutual Insurance Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1492 at 1505 para. 24.
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“I am far from saying that what has been called this multiple trigger or, 
sometimes, triple trigger theory (exposure, development of disease, and 
diagnosis) might not be held, on some future occasion, to be appropri-
ate for employers’ liability policies in general, depending on the precise 
words used. But, as far as public liability policies are concerned with the 
specific wording used in the present cases, I see no need for the English 
courts to adopt the multiple trigger theory. It has been adopted in the 
United States avowedly for policy reasons in relation to the vastly greater 
numbers of asbestos-disease sufferers in that country. I see no reason to 
adopt it in this particular case where the same policy considerations are 
not present.”
We must therefore await the results of the current litigation to discover whether 
there will be any more certainty with regard to which trigger is to be appli-
cable. However, the prospect arises of there being gaps in insurance coverage, 
with the result that claimants will then be uncompensated.
Apportionment between insurers
No matter what the trigger, if several insurers are involved there can be dif-
ficulties in apportioning liability among them. There are various possibilities. 
For example, the insurers could each be held jointly and severally liable up 
to their policy limits. Alternatively, they could be held responsible only for a 
share of the damage based on the different lengths of time they were on risk, or 
according to the different limits in the respective policies. In Barker v Corus33 
the House of Lords held that the insurers were not liable in full for the dam-
age caused but only to the extent of the probability that the employer they in-
sured had caused the asbestos-related injury. This could have led to substantial 
under-compensation of those who had worked for several employers and who, 
for a variety of reasons, could not sue or enforce a judgment against one or 
more of them. As a result, the decision led to considerable protest from claim-
ants, their trade unions and their lawyers. The Government immediately took 
action. For asbestos cases alone involving the disease mesothelioma, the Lords 
decision was effectively reversed by the Compensation Act 2006, sec. 3 which 
makes defendants liable jointly and severally for the whole of the damage. 
Asbestos claimants thus gain full compensation even if only one of the former 
employers has insurance coverage. However, apart from these asbestos cases, 
the proportionate damages approach adopted by the Law Lords in Barker re-
mains good law.
Claims-made policies
Because of the possible confusion caused by these various theories of when 
an “occurrence” triggers liability under a policy, the London insurance mar-
ket introduced a new form of words into policies in the 1980s. Rather than 
33 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572.
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referring to occurrences, these policies base liability on when claims are made 
against the insured. Although there can be difficulties in defining the meaning 
of “claim,” liability here is much more certain. Insurers are attracted to such 
policies because they are able to close their books at the end of the year and 
they have no need to fear a “long tail” liability. This wording has been increas-
ingly used in product liability insurance and, for example, applies to nearly all 
policies taken out by pharmaceutical companies. However, it has been attacked 
in other countries with some vigour, and in France there was an attempt to 
make “claims-made” policies illegal for certain types of insurance.34 However, 
the severe restrictions imposed by the Cour de cassation in 1990 were eased 
in 2003.35
42. CASE STUDY (long tail damage) P Company develops, manufactures and 
distributes motor equipment, including fuel pumps. As the result of a design 
fault in the pumps, the fuel supply of motor vehicles in which they are incorpo-
rated is often interrupted without warning. Assume that this leads to numerous 
accidents for which P Company is liable under your laws on product liability. 
Until a) the pump’s development, b) its manufacture, c) its distribution, and 
d) the consequent accidents, P Company’s product liability was insured by I. 
After the termination of the insurance contract with I, P Company takes out in-
surance with J. Which insurer, I or J, has to cover P Company’s liability for its 
faulty fuel pumps in each of scenarios a)-d)? Assume that the standard terms of 
both insurers’ contracts contain clauses on liability for long tail damage that 
are most common in your country.
The change in policy wording described above (supra no. 45) helps to answer 
this question. When a policy has been issued on claims-based liability that li-
ability is triggered only by the claims resulting from the accidents themselves 
in (d) and not by the earlier periods of risk-creating activity in (a) – (c).36 What 
constitutes a claim for this purpose, and when a claim has been made or re-
ceived, has also been the subject of litigation.37
However, having found more certainty in a particular phrase, insurers have 
then made matters more complicated by arranging for the phrase to be super-
seded by extensions and revisions to policies. We have already seen the com-
plications that resulted when the word “accident” was revised to “occurrence” 
to accommodate the demands of the market for cover for damage occurring 
gradually. Similarly, claims-made policies have also been extended to offer 
much wider cover. Insureds can protect themselves against claims arising after 
a policy terminates in two ways. They can obtain “prior acts” coverage under 
34 M.A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (5th ed. 2006) para. 17-4B.
35 M. Schubert, Coverage Triggers in French Liability Insurance, (2003/July) Insurance Law 
Monthly. See further S. Galand-Carval, Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in France: 
Tort Law and Insurance (contained in this volume) no. 92 ff. and 99.
36 Tioixide Europe Ltd v CGU International Insurance plc [2005] Lloyd’s Rep IR 114, affirmed 
[2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 31.
37 Clarke (fn. 34) para. 17-4D.
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which the new insurer charges an additional premium to cover for events oc-
curring before the beginning of the new policy. Another option is to purchase 
an extended reporting period, or “tail” coverage from the old insurer. This cov-
ers future claims made for incidents occurring during the time of the claims-
made coverage. In effect, it converts claims-made into occurrence coverage. 
It then gives rise to problems, highlighted above, concerning what is to be the 
effective date of the occurrence which triggers liability under the policy.
Liability limits in compulsory third-party insurance4. 
43. Would the fact that, in certain fields, third-party insurance is required by 
law have any effect on the extent to which liability limits in terms of aggregate 
series clauses, claims series clauses and long tail damage clauses are legally 
allowed?
This depends upon the wording of the statute imposing compulsory insurance. 
In road traffic insurance, for example, the cover that is required is without 
limit. Therefore aggregate clauses which imposed an upper limit on liability 
would not meet the statutory requirements, and those who took out policies 
with such limits would be committing criminal offences. In contrast, however, 
insurance against employer’s liability is only required up to a stated maximum 
sum. In such a circumstance any limits which confined liability to that maxi-
mum figure would be acceptable. 
ConclusionIII. 
There is much uncertainty about both the law and practice in relation to insur-
ance aspects of the divisibility of damage. The lack of empirical research of 
insurers’ practices makes it difficult to assess how claims are assessed initially 
and how disputes are actually treated by insurers. Furthermore, the diversity 
of insurance policies makes it difficult to formulate general statements about 
the law: much depends upon the particular policy wording and the specific 
circumstances of the claim. There are no standard form policies for United 
Kingdom risks.
Perhaps because of this uncertainty there is a growing body of case law in this 
area. It is clear that more disputes are now reaching court. There is an increas-
ing sophistication in the analysis of causal factors relevant to loss. This may be 
driven in part by increasing scientific understanding of the complexity of the 
material world, and a psychological recognition that simplistic accounts will 
not suffice. This adds to the readiness of the parties to contest ultimate respon-
sibility for the loss, and it fuels refined judicial analysis of the facts giving rise 
to the dispute.
Insurers have continued to revise their policies in order to combat increasing 
exposure to liability as a result of recognition of these wider causal factors. 
Clauses have been added and liability defined in more and more detail in an at-
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tempt to preclude certain possibilities. In particular, there has been concern to 
avoid liability for injuries which occur gradually over a period of time. How-
ever, in demanding that damage must result from specific events, such as an 
accident or occurrence, policies have proved to be unduly restrictive. Market 
forces have then led to a relaxation in the wording of some policies. In addi-
tion, social and other factors favouring insurance coverage have encouraged 
courts, especially in the USA, to interpret policies in favour of claimants. The 
overall picture is therefore a complex one.
It is apparent that most of the major issues confronting the UK courts have 
been litigated previously and more extensively in the USA. Although the USA 
cases favouring insurance coverage have not always been followed by courts 
in the UK, they have had an influence. It is true that the American market is 
significantly different from that in the UK. In particular, it makes more exten-
sive use of standard form policies, and there are very different factors affecting 
insurances – such as those covering environmental pollution and product li-
ability – which lie at the heart of the divisibility of damage debates. In particu-
lar, it is noteworthy that there have been no concerns over asbestos litigation 
in Germany, for example, because such diseases are not compensated within 
the tort system but as part of social insurance. Liability insurance issues do not 
then arise. However, for a variety of reasons American policy wording is in-
creasingly making its way to Europe, and the nature of disputes (if not always 
their outcome) is broadly similar. This does not make these disputes easier to 
solve, but by looking across the Atlantic we might be better prepared to see 
what is coming. 
Here it is suggested that European insurers have been slow to react to these 
changes of wording to deal with multiple causation issues, and as a result have 
become exposed to a wider time range within which liabilities may be estab-
lished. If this is the case, insurers should pay close attention to aggregation and 
divisibility issues. Policies can, and should, be amended to ensure that the ex-
tent of the risk matches that which was intended when the premiums were first 
set. Of course, this basic objective is pursued by every underwriter on a day to 
day basis. It is all too easy to state and is always much harder to implement in 
practice. Issues regarding aggregation and divisibility of damage will continue 
to grow in importance in insurance and tort law for some time to come. This is 
because of the central importance of insurance to this area of civil litigation. It 
is the driving force – the “lifeblood” – of the tort system. Without it, in many 
cases, damages would not be paid and cases would simply not be litigated. We 
would live in a very different legal world.38
38 See supra fn. 1.
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